Health Insurance Exchanges
The health insurance exchanges are online marketplaces that individuals can utilize to compare and purchase health insurance plans. 10 The exchanges are meant to be a sort of one-stop shop for health insurance. 11 The idea is that each State's exchange will provide people that are looking for health insurance with an opportunity to view and compare plans side-by-side; this format was designed to increase competition between health insurers and thus promote better and cheaper health plans. 12 The ACA also uses the exchanges as a mechanism for regulation. Many of the ACA's regulations apply only to plans that are offered and obtained through the exchanges. 13 
The Individual Mandate
The individual mandate, put simply, requires Americans to purchase minimum essential coverage health insurance or else pay a tax penalty. 14 However, the ACA's unaffordability exemption provides that if the cost of the cheapest plan on a State's exchange exceeds 8% of an individual's income, that person is not required to purchase health insurance and is also exempt from the tax penalty that would normally be assessed to persons who do not have health insurance. 15 10 Health Insurance Marketplace, HEALTHCARE There are also a number of other exemptions that allow individuals to not purchase health insurance and still avoid the tax penalty, most of which involve circumstances in which an individual is under financial stress. 16 However, since the ACA expanded Medicaid to cover all individuals between the ages of 18 and 65 whose income does not exceed 138% of the Federal Poverty Level, many of the individuals that qualify for these exemptions that stem from a lowincome will still have access to health insurance. 17 
Premium Tax Credits
More relevant here are the premium tax credits that the ACA provides. These tax credits are provided to low-and middle-income Americans to subsidize the premiums of insurance they purchase through the exchanges. Because of this function, they are often referred to as premium subsidies. 18 Premium subsidies are available to individuals and families with an annual income of up to 400% of the Federal Poverty Level. 19 These premium subsidies are paid by the Federal government directly to a qualifying individual's insurance provider in order to subsidize the qualifying individual's premiums under the plan. 20 
The Guaranteed Issue Requirement
Also very pertinent to this situation is the ACA's guaranteed issue requirement. This requirement means that health insurers may not deny any individual coverage because that person has a preexisting condition, 21 such as HIV/AIDS. 22 
The Community Rating Requirement
The community rating requirement makes it illegal for health insurers to discriminate against individuals with a preexisting condition, 23 such as HIV/AIDS, 24 in terms of the price of coverage. This requirement means that health insurers cannot charge individuals with a preexisting condition a higher rate for coverage than individuals without a preexisting condition. 25 However, there are a few exceptions. Health insurers can still charge higher rates to individuals based on age, tobacco use, and geography. 26 This means that rates may be higher for individuals that are older, use tobacco, or live in a geographic region of the U.S. in which medical costs are higher than average. 27 B. The Post-ACA Landscape: Three Insurance Practices As has just been briefly explained, the ACA has many moving parts that together create an environment that is supposed to bring access to affordable, quality health insurance to everyone, regardless of their health status or history. The guaranteed issue and community rating 21 42 U.S.C. § § 300gg-300gg-7 (2015 requirements are two of the most important of these moving parts. Together, they mean that health insurers can no longer refuse to cover individuals with HIV/AIDS 28 or charge such individuals a higher rate for coverage than those without the disease. 29 However, some insurers are finding more subtle ways to continue discriminating against individuals with HIV/AIDS in an attempt to discourage them from enrolling in their plans. 30 Specifically, these insurers have continued to discriminate in three main ways. First, many insurers are discriminating via the design of their prescription drug formularies. 31 These insurers design their formularies with 28 The Affordable Care Act and HIV/AIDS, supra note 1. 29 42 U.S.C. § § 300gg, 300gg-2 (2015 will often refer to this practice as "high tiering." Second, many insurers discriminate against individuals with HIV/AIDS, who take HIV/AIDS medications, by imposing step-therapy requirements. 34 Step-therapy requirements force individuals to use less effective drugs in order to prove them to be ineffective before qualifying for the use of effective medications. 35 And third, these insurers impose preauthorization requirements for HIV/AIDS medications. 36 Pre-authorization requirements force individuals to obtain permission from their insurer before every refill of their medications. 37 
D. Roadmap
This note seeks to determine whether § 1557 will be effective at ending, or at least reducing, insurers' discrimination against individuals with HIV/AIDS in the form of high tiering, step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements. To make this determination, this note will adhere to the following itinerary. First, this note will explain in more detail the detrimental effects of the three aforementioned health insurance practices on individuals with HIV/AIDS in order to facilitate an understanding as to why they should be opposed. Next, it will examine what entities § 1557 applies to. Then, this note will discuss whether § 1557 prohibits intentional discrimination, and if so, whether these three insurance practices constitute such prohibited intentional discrimination.
Next will be a discussion of whether § 1557 prohibits disparate impact discrimination, and if so, whether such discrimination is present in this case. And finally, a policy consideration for the application of § 1557 will be discussed.
II. THE THREE DISCRIMINATORY HEALTH INSURANCE PRACTICES
Without an understanding of the nature of the HIV/AIDS virus and the standard of care for treating it, the harmful effects these three aforementioned insurance practices have on individuals with HIV/AIDS cannot be fully appreciated. Therefore, a brief overview of HIV/AIDS is appropriate.
A. The Nature and Standard of Care for Treating HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS is an extremely complex virus that attacks the human immune system. 42 HIV/AIDS can replicate billions of times per day and has a very error-prone replication process; as a result, it has an extremely high mutation rate. 43 Because of this, treating HIV/AIDS is very difficult. In order to effectively manage the virus, multiple HIV/AIDS medications must be used in unison. 44 Furthermore, any cessation in an individual taking medication gives the virus the opportunity to replicate, mutate, and become resistant to that medication. 45 Drug resistant HIV/AIDS is extremely troubling because not all HIV/AIDS medications work for a particular individual, 46 and many HIV/AIDS medications have toxic side effects. 47 So if a person has a lapse in taking his or her effective medication, and their strain of HIV/AIDS becomes resistant to that medication as a result, that person cannot continue to take that drug and may have a limited selection of other drugs to switch to due to side effects and ineffectiveness. Because of this, the medical standard of care for treating HIV/AIDS provides that a person diagnosed with HIV/AIDS begin taking medication as soon as possible after being diagnosed and have no lapses in treatment. 48 In order to facilitate this, the medical standard of care provides that the most effective way to treat HIV/AIDS patients is with a single-tablet regimen (STR) instead of multiple pills per day 49 -this increases adherence to treatment, decreasing dangerous interruptions in treatment. 50 The medically "preferred regimens" of STRs for treating HIV/AIDS include Atripla, Truvada-Reyataz-Norvir, Truvada-Prezista-Norvir, Truvada-Isentress, Stribild, Tivicay-Epzicom, and TivicayTruvada. 51 With a better understanding of how HIV/AIDS works and is treated, a look into how high tiering, step-therapy, and preauthorization requirements can negatively affect individuals with HIV/AIDS is now appropriate.
B. The Detrimental Effects of These Three Aforementioned Practices on Individuals with HIV/AIDS
The next three subsections will explain how high tiering, step-therapy, and pre-authorization requirements can have harmful consequences for individuals with HIV/AIDS. 59 And remember, it is necessary for an individual with HIV/AIDS to take not only one of these drugs, but a combination of these drugs in unison. 60 But, one might think, the above numbers are the total costs of the drugs; with insurance the drugs are probably cheap enough that people can afford them, right? Not when these drugs are placed on the highest cost sharing tiers of a health insurers' prescription drug formulary. 61 In Illinois, Aetna, Coventry, and Humana all place most HIV/AIDS medications, and indeed all of the medically preferred regimens, on the highest tiers of their formularies. 62 64 And under the best plan that Humana offers on the Illinois Health Insurance Exchange, the monthly out-ofpocket cost to a plan beneficiary for Atripla is about $1,126; for Truvada-Reyataz-Norvir is about $1,541; for TruvadaPrezista-Norvir is about $1,542; for Truvada-Isentress is about $1,348; for Stribild is about $1,405; for TivicayEpzicom is about $1,172; and for Tivicay-Truvada is about $1,321. 65 In 2013, the median household, or combined family, income ranged from about $90,000 to about $45,000 per year. 66 So if someone with a $60,000 yearly salary were to have the best plan that Humana offers through the Illinois marketplace and that person had been prescribed Atripla, he or she would be spending over 22% of their yearly income on their Atripla alone. If someone with a $45,000 yearly salary were to have the best plan that Humana offers through the Illinois marketplace and that person had been prescribed Atripla, he or she would be spending about 30% of their yearly income on their Atripla alone. Thirty percent of a family's income is a substantial amount, to say the least. Thus, it seems safe to say that when these drugs are placed 63 Id. 64 in an insurer's highest formulary tiers, they are extremely expensive and virtually unaffordable to most low-and middle-income Americans. It is apparent that this practice of high tiering by insurers can be financially challenging, or even crippling-depending on an individual's income. This financial burden by itself imposes great harm to individuals with HIV/AIDS. However, the harm does not stop at the pocketbook. Such a high cost for these drugs can mean that many people with HIV/AIDS cannot afford their medication every month. What happens when someone cannot afford to pay for his or her medication for a month? Answer: they do not take it. This is a lapse in treatment, which can lead to a dangerous strain of drugresistant HIV/AIDS. 67 In sum, this high tiering practice may not only create an extreme financial burden on beneficiaries with HIV/AIDS, but can also lead to medically dangerous lapses in treatment.
Step therapy requirements
Step-therapy requirements force individuals to use less effective drugs in order to prove they are ineffective before qualifying for the use of effective medications. 68 The medical standard of care dictates that an individual should begin treatment as soon as possible after being diagnosed with HIV/AIDS and have no lapses in treatment. 69 This keeps the virus at bay from mutation and thus prevents drug resistance. 70 Step-therapy, by its very nature, violates this standard of care and gives the virus the opportunity to mutate and become drug resistant because either: (1) a person is diagnosed with HIV/AIDS and enrolls in a plan-or is already enrolled in a plan-with a step-therapy requirement that requires them to take less-than-optimallyeffective drugs for a period of time, which functionally 67 Yates, supra note 31, at 4. 68 constitutes a delay in initial treatment; or (2) a person who has had HIV/AIDS for some time and has been using an effective drug enrolls in a plan that has a step-therapy requirement and must switch to a less effective drug for a period of time, which functionally constitutes a lapse in treatment. It is in this way that step-therapy requirements harm individuals with HIV/AIDS who are subjected to them.
Pre-authorization requirements
Pre-authorization requirements have largely the same effect that step-therapy requirements do: they cause lapses in treatment.
This is because pre-authorization requirements mandate that beneficiaries must obtain permission from the insurer before every refill of their medication, 71 and due to the large size and bureaucratic nature of insurance companies, that permission can often take longer to obtain than expected. 72 This delay in permission from the insurance companies can lead to dangerous lapses of treatment. It is in this way that preauthorization requirements harm individuals with HIV/AIDS who are subjected to them.
It is apparent that these three health insurance practices are acutely detrimental to individuals with HIV/AIDS who are subject to them. However, § 1557 may be able to neutralize these practices and provide such individuals with relief from this discrimination. An analysis of § 1557 and its possible application to such practices follows.
III. COVERED ENTITIES UNDER § 1557
To determine whether § 1557 of the ACA will be effective at ending, or at least reducing, insurers' practices of high tiering and step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements with HIV/AIDS medications, it is necessary to determine what entities the provision actually applies to. To be an effective means of combating these health insurance practices, § 1557 must extend to the vast majority of health 71 insurance companies and thus by extension to the health plans they provide. Section 1557 applies to "any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments)." 73 There are two key pieces at work here: "health program or activity" and "Federal financial assistance." Therefore, to determine whether § 1557 extends to health insurance companies, these two key pieces must be examined. First, it must be determined what "Federal financial assistance" is and whether health insurance companies receive it. And second, it must be determined what a health "program or activity" is and if health insurance companies qualify as such a health "program or activity." If health insurance companies do qualify as health "programs or activities" and receive "Federal financial assistance," section 1557 will apply to such health insurers.
A. "Federal Financial Assistance" What qualifies as "Federal financial assistance?" There is a vast array of Federal programs that provide various types of assistance. However, the ACA's premium tax credits will be focused on here. This is partly due to the impracticability of exploring every Federal program that provides financial assistance and partly due to the importance and prominence of the premium tax credits. The premium tax credits are especially pertinent in the context of § 1557 covered entities because many people will qualify for them. 74 So if these credits qualify as "Federal financial assistance" then many insurers will receive such federal assistance because they provide coverage to those individuals who qualify for the credits. Section 1557 explicitly provides that "Federal financial assistance" includes "credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance." 75 The "credits" and "subsidies" referred to by § 1557 seemingly refer to-or at least include-the premium tax credits provided pursuant to the ACA. This makes sense for two reasons. First, it is logical for § 1557 to refer to and use such a key piece of the Act of which it is a part of to effect its specific purpose. As was explained above, the premium tax credits are a key part of the ACA. Without the premium tax credits, the ACA could not stand. 76 It makes sense for the ACA to use such a key component of itself to be the foundation of this nondiscrimination provision. And second, the premium tax credits are both a "credit"-in that they are literally a tax credit-and a "subsidy"-in that they literally subsidize insurance premiums. Furthermore, the premium tax credits are the epitome of "Federal financial assistance;" the federal government is literally assisting in the payment of insurance premiums.
As the analysis above illustrates that it is likely that premium tax subsidies qualify as "Federal financial assistance," the next inquiry to make here is: will most health insurance companies receive these premium tax subsidies? More and more health insurance companies offer, or will offer, health plans through the exchanges. 77 Thus, it is very likely that each insurer offering plans through the exchanges will inevitably receive premium subsidies through beneficiaries of some of those plans. This is because the premium subsidies are available for individuals and families with incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty level, which encompasses an extremely large group of people. 78 large, and increasing, number of health insurers offering plans on the exchanges and with a large portion of the population qualifying for premium subsidies, the vast majority of health insurers are likely to receive premium subsidies-"Federal financial assistance"-via the beneficiaries of their plans that are sold on the exchanges.
However, at first blush, there seems to be a wrinkle here. While the premium subsidy is paid directly to the insurer, 79 in actuality it is a premium tax credit of the individual who purchases the plan, and it subsidizes the cost of insurance to the individual. Therefore, one might think, the individuals, not the insurers, are receiving the "Federal financial assistance." However, this argument is not consistent with the law.
In Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Moreno, a terminated employee of the railroad company Conrail, filed suit under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that his termination was due to his disability-diabetes. 80 In response, Conrail maintained that it was not a recipient of federal financial assistance and therefore not subject to § 504 regulation. 81 Conrail received government money for railroad crossing improvements. 82 The improvements were paid to the State of Michigan and then subsequently to Conrail. 83 Conrail argued that while it did receive such government money, it was not the "recipient" of federal financial assistance because the ultimate beneficiary was the traveling public, who benefitted from safe railroad crossings. 84 The court found this argument unpersuasive, Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Grove City College v. Bell, spoke on the scope of the coverage of antidiscrimination statutes. 87 In Grove City College, a college refused to agree to the antidiscrimination terms under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 in order to utilize certain student educational funding. 88 The Court found that although the students were the ultimate beneficiaries of the student educational funding, the college was a "recipient" of federal financial assistance due to such government funding. 89 In addition, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has issued a regulation which defines a "recipient" under § 504 as "any state . . . or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient . . . but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance." 90 In the current situation, the ultimate beneficiary of the premium subsidies are the individuals who qualify for such premium tax credits. However, the premium subsidies are paid from the Federal government directly to the health insurer. 91 Indeed, this is more direct than in Moreno when the State of Michigan acted as a middle-man and the court in that case still found Conrail to be a recipient of "Federal financial assistance." In addition, the health insurers in the current situation are like Conrail in Moreno and the college in Grove City College: although they are not the true beneficiaries of the federal funds, they still qualify as recipients of "Federal financial assistance." Indeed, individuals who qualify for premium tax credits are equivalent to the students in Grove City College who 85 Moreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d at 787-788. 86 Id. qualified for student educational funding. They are the ultimate beneficiaries of the funding, but because the money is paid to the institution handling their affairs, the institution is the recipient of "Federal financial assistance" for legal purposes. Moreover, the HHS regulations have specifically excluded ultimate beneficiaries, such as the students in Grove City College or the plan beneficiaries who qualify for premium tax credits in the current situation, from being the legal recipients of "Federal financial assistance" and instead designated the entity that the government money is extended to as the recipient. Therefore, health insurance companies become the recipients of "Federal financial assistance" when they receive government money in the form of premium tax subsidies. This greatly expands the coverage of § 1557. Also keep in mind that there are many other ways that an insurer can receive "Federal financial assistance" aside from premium tax subsidies. Taking that into consideration, § 1557's coverage is broader still.
Therefore, most insurance companies in the United States will likely receive "Federal financial assistance."
B. "Program or Activity"
Since, in this context, discrimination against individuals with HIV/AIDS is prohibited by § 1557 through its invocation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and because § 1557 does not specifically define "program or activity," it seems appropriate to use the definition of "program or activity" provided by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that, among other things, a "program or activity" means all operations of: (3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship-(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or (ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and recreation [.] 92 With this definition, it is now possible to answer the question: do health insurance companies qualify as health "programs or activities?" Insurance companies are corporations. However, there are a great many insurance companies in the United States and not all of their corporate structures are the same. This makes a broad analysis of whether health insurers receive assistance "as a whole" overly cumbersome. This point is also moot due to the second portion of the definition of "program or activity" presented above.
This is because even if a health insurer does not receive the assistance "as a whole," they still qualify as a "health program or activity." The second piece of the definition of health "program or activity" only requires that the corporation be "principally engaged in the business of providing . . . health care." Since insurance companies are "principally engaged in the business of providing" health care, they likely qualify as a "program[] or activit [y] ."
C. Putting It Together
Having explored the two key pieces of § 1557 that describe covered entities, it is now appropriate to put those two key pieces together in regard to health insurance companiesand by extension the health plans such insurers provide. Health insurance companies likely qualify as health "programs or activities"; and they will probably receive "federal financial assistance" in one form or another; therefore, they are likely covered entities under § 1557. However, the covered entity analysis does not stop here; there is one important question that must still be answered.
D. A Wrinkle?
If a health insurance company receives federal financial assistance in the form of the ACA's premium subsidies from one plan offered through an exchange, does that company have to make sure that all of the plans it offers, both in and out of the exchanges, comply with § 1557? Recall that Grove City College was the case in which a college did not want to comply with antidiscrimination regulations in order to be able to utilize federal funds for its students. 94 The Court found that the Department of Education had the authority to withdraw the student educational funding because Grove City College received federal financial assistance through that student funding. 95 However, the Court noted that only the specific funding program that received the Federal financial assistance was subject to regulation and not Grove City College as a whole. 96 Essentially, the court took a very narrow approach to "program or activity." Under this approach, if an institution were to receive "Federal financial assistance," only the specific part of the institution that received that assistance would be subject to antidiscrimination regulations, not the institution as a whole in every aspect of its business. But this narrow reading by the Court does not negatively affect the current situation being analyzed. Here, a health insurance company receives federal financial assistance through premium subsidies.
According to Grove City College, the antidiscrimination scrutiny must be "program specific." 97 However, this does not mean scrutiny is extended only to the plan which triggered the premium subsidy but rather that scrutiny is extended to the entire program of the health insurance company which provides health plans. This is so because no case law has taken "program specific" to the extreme of meaning "individually specific." For example, in U.S. v. Baylor University Medical Center, the court sought to determine whether and to what extent Medicare and Medicaid payments subjected a hospital to the scrutiny of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 98 The court first determined that Medicare and Medicaid payments qualified as "Federal 93 Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 94 Id. at 561. 95 Id. at 575-576. 96 Id. at 570-571. 97 Id. 
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INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 13:1 financial assistance." 99 Then the Court sought to determine whether the antidiscrimination scrutiny applied to the hospital as a whole or to just the inpatient emergency room services that led to the Medicare and Medicaid payments in the first place. 100 The Court held that the hospital's inpatient and emergency room services were subject to antidiscrimination scrutiny, but that the entire hospital as a whole was not because of the "program specific" requirement. 101 Notice that the court did not say that only the specific individuals who caused the Medicare and Medicaid payments to be made to the hospital were subject to scrutiny, but rather all inpatient and emergency room services. In the current situation, it would not just be the specific, individual plan that will be subject to § 504 -and thus § 1557 -scrutiny, but rather the entire program that deals with insurance plans. So while only some plans will trigger the premium subsidies that make the insurance companies recipients of federal financial assistance, all plans which said company provides will likely be subject to § 1557.
E. Other Means of § 1557 Coverage
While the premium tax credits system will likely serve as the broadest means by which a health insurance company can be subject to § 1557 regulation, there are other means. First, Executive Agencies and any other entities established under the ACA are subject to § 1557 regulation. 102 Second, Medicare and Medicaid payments will also trigger § 1557 regulation. 103 And lastly, health insurance companies that do not offer plans through the exchanges can receive "federal financial assistance" in a variety of other ways outside of premium tax subsidy payments, thus making them subject to § 1557 regulation. With all of these various means by which health insurance companies can qualify as covered entities under § 1557, the vast majority of health insurance plans in the United States should be subject to § 1557. In order to determine whether § 1557 will be effective at ending health insurers' practices of high tiering and steptherapy and pre-authorization requirements for individuals with HIV/AIDS, it must be determined both what type and what mode of discrimination § 1557 prohibits. The "type" of discrimination will refer to what basis discrimination is prohibited on. The "mode" of discrimination will refer to the method of discrimination: either intentional or disparate impact. 104 Then it must be determined whether high tiering and step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements constitute such prohibited discrimination under § 1557.
Since § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the relevant antidiscrimination statute invoked by § 1557 in terms of HIV/AIDS discrimination, this discussion will be based on § 504.
A. What Type of Discrimination is Prohibited by § 1557?
Section 1557 prohibits discrimination "on the ground prohibited under . . . section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." 105 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. 106 The Supreme Court has held HIV/AIDS to be a disability. 107 Therefore, § 1557 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV/AIDS status.
But presently, the aforementioned insurance practices are not explicitly based on the forbidden criterion HIV/AIDS. While disability is a forbidden criterion on which 110 The Court was not even concerned as to whether § 504 prohibits intentional discrimination; it took that for granted. 111 The Court used intentional discrimination as a starting point, or a floor, for § 504. 112 The issue, in the Court's opinion, was not whether § 504 prohibits intentional discrimination but whether it prohibits disparate impact discrimination. 113 From Alexander v. Choate, it is clear that § 504 prohibits intentional discrimination. Indeed, if it did not, the provision would be meaningless. Intentional discrimination is the most blatant and most basic form of discrimination.
If intentional discrimination is not prohibited by § 504, then no discrimination is prohibited and the law is useless.
C. High Tiering and
Step-Therapy and Pre-Authorization Requirements: Intentional Discrimination?
1. Preliminary Question 1: Are These Three Insurance Practices Discriminatory to Begin With?
Discrimination is not defined in § 1557. However, courts have traditionally found "discrimination" to mean differential treatment based on a forbidden criterion. 114 Since it is apparent that individuals with HIV/AIDS -which is a disability and therefore a forbidden criterion -are being targeted by these practices, it must be determined whether these practices constitute differential treatment. High tiering, step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements seem to constitute differential treatment. These practices deny meaningful coverage to individuals with HIV/AIDS and do not occur with other individuals.
When an insurer places all or most of the effective HIV/AIDS drugs on the highest cost-sharing tiers of their 110 Step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements only add to the likelihood of treatment interruption.
Step-therapy requirements require individuals to take less effective and potentially toxic generic drugs before moving on to the brand-name drugs that are actually effective. 117 Individuals with HIV/AIDS subjected to steptherapy requirements are really experiencing an interruption in treatment since their HIV/AIDS is not being effectively treated but allowed to replicate and mutate.
Finally, pre-authorization requirements also cause interruptions in treatment. Since an individual subjected to a pre-authorization requirement must obtain permission from his or her insurer before every refill of their medication, there are often delays in obtaining the refill for the medication, leading to dangerous interruptions in treatment. These insurance practices cause effective HIV/AIDS drugs to be virtually unaffordable and cause dangerous interruptions in treatment. Therefore, these insurance practices cause the plans to be effectively useless to individuals with HIV/AIDS, as opposed to individuals without the disease. Since individuals without HIV/AIDS do not need HIV/AIDS medications, these plans would be more favorable for individuals without the disease. This has the effect of discouraging individuals with HIV/AIDS from enrolling in these plans; but since individuals without HIV/AIDS do not require HIV/AIDS medication, these practices have no discouraging effect on individuals without HIV/AIDS. This is the differential treatment constituting discrimination. Before moving on to inquire as to whether the discrimination was intentional, another important point must be made. It seems obvious that that portion of insurers that adhere to the aforementioned practices do so intentionally. There is no law requiring these practices, and the practices were not written into the plan by accident. Each company designs its own prescription drug formularies and decides whether to institute step-therapy and preauthorization requirements for HIV/AIDS drugs. When an insurer places all or most effective HIV/AIDS drugs on the highest tiers of a prescription formulary and institutes steptherapy and pre-authorization requirements, it does so intentionally and not by market force. Note that it is not being said that these practices are intentionally discriminatory, but merely that they are intentionally put into place. Basically, insurance companies cannot say that they have no other choice than to implement these practices; they cannot say that there is no discriminatory intent because they simply did not want to implement these practices in the first place. If they did not want to or intend to implement these practices, they simply would not have done so.
3. Are Health Insurance Companies that are Adhering to These Practices Exhibiting Intentional Discrimination?
One can see that these insurance practices are discriminatory and that they are being implemented intentionally, but the big question here is whether this discrimination is intentional. medical coverage solely based on their disabilities. 118 In 1994, Hawaii developed this "QUEST" program in order to provide health insurance to more of its low-income citizens. 119 Hawaii explicitly and categorically excluded individuals who were over 65 years old, blind, or disabled. 120 For an award of compensatory damages, the Court needed to determine whether the state of Hawaii had intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs. 121 The Court stated that an entity exhibits discriminatory intent -intentional discrimination -when it is "deliberate[ly] indifferen [t] ." 122 The Court went on to say that "[d]eliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood." 123 It continued, "The first element is satisfied when the . . . entity has notice that an accommodation is required. The second element is satisfied if the entity's 'failure to act [is] a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness." 124 Furthermore, an entity "at the very least" exhibits "deliberate indifference" when facial discrimination is present because "by its very terms, facial discrimination is 'intentional.'" 125 The Court reasoned that because Hawaii had categorically excluded disabled individuals from the program when it knew that doing so would mean some of those individuals would ultimately go without coverage altogether, it did not act with enough care to protect the rights of its disabled citizens. 126 It also stated that Hawaii had facially discriminated against disabled individuals in the QUEST program. 127 had exhibited "deliberate indifference" and therefore intentional discrimination in the design of its QUEST program. 128 It appears that the insurance companies that adhere to these practices are exhibiting "deliberate indifference" and are therefore intentionally discriminating. As described above, when discrimination is of the type described as facial discrimination, it is per se deemed to be intentional discrimination. It seems that is the type of discrimination at play here. It is not the case that there is some other criteria that is being used and these drugs are disproportionately affected by it. The companies that adhere to these practices are explicitly designating HIV/AIDS medications for high tiering and step-therapy and pre-authorization requirements. Therefore, this discrimination seems facial and thus intentional.
On the other hand, this discrimination might be viewed as not being facial simply because it does target the HIV/AIDS drugs and not individuals with HIV/AIDS themselves. However, as was previously explained, targeting HIV/AIDS drugs is the equivalent of targeting individuals with HIV/AIDS themselves. So the argument in favor of these practices constituting facial discrimination-and thus intentional discrimination-seems to remain strong. Indeed, the present situation is much like that in Lovell. Just as Hawaii had explicitly and categorically provided in its laws that the QUEST program excluded disabled individuals, some insurance companies are explicitly providing that these overly burdensome practices only apply to HIV/AIDS medications-thus effectively only to individuals with HIV/AIDS.
If these practices are not considered to be intentional discrimination under this sort of per se facial discrimination standard, they likely will be under the two-pronged "deliberate indifference" test laid out by the court in Lovell.
Recall that "[t]he first element [of deliberate indifference] is satisfied when the . . . entity has notice that an accommodation is required. 129 Here, all insurance companies
